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Abstract
A large portion of passenger requests is reportedly unserviced, partially due to vacant for-hire drivers’
cruising behavior during the passenger seeking process. This paper aims to model the multi-driver repo-
sitioning task through a mean field multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) approach that captures
competition among multiple agents. Because the direct application of MARL to the multi-driver sys-
tem under a given reward mechanism will likely yield a suboptimal equilibrium due to the selfishness
of drivers, this study proposes a reward design scheme with which a more desired equilibrium can be
reached. To effectively solve the bilevel optimization problem with upper level as the reward design and
the lower level as a multi-agent system, a Bayesian optimization (BO) algorithm is adopted to speed up
the learning process. We then apply the bilevel optimization model to two case studies, namely, e-hailing
driver repositioning under service charge and multiclass taxi driver repositioning under NYC congestion
pricing. In the first case study, the model is validated by the agreement between the derived optimal
control from BO and that from an analytical solution. With a simple piecewise linear service charge,
the objective of the e-hailing platform can be increased by 8.4%. In the second case study, an optimal
toll charge of $5.1 is solved using BO, which improves the objective of city planners by 7.9%, compared
to that without any toll charge. Under this optimal toll charge, the number of taxis in the NYC central
business district is decreased, indicating a better traffic condition, without substantially increasing the
crowdedness of the subway system.
Keywords: Mean Field Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning, Reward Design, Bayesian Optimization
1. Introduction
The emergence of transportation network companies (TNCs) or e-hailing platforms (such as Didi and
Uber) has revolutionizsed the traditional taxi market and provided commuters a flexible-route door-to-
door mobility service. Nonetheless, it is reported that a large portion of the passenger requests remain
unserviced (Lin et al., 2018), partly due to the imbalance between demand (i.e., passenger requests)
and supply (i.e., available drivers) that results in long cruising trips for taxi drivers to find the next
passenger and long waiting time for passengers to be picked up (Powell et al., 2011; Di and Ban, 2019).
Such cruising behavior has negative impact on urban economy by not only decreasing drivers’ income
but also generating additional vehicle miles traveled. Thus, repositioning available drivers to potential
locations with near-future high demand, i.e., to balance supply and demand, becomes the key challenge
faced by the taxi and for-hire market, including e-hailing platforms.
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1.1. Problem statement
This paper aims to solve the multi-driver repositioning task, in which a large number of idle drivers
make sequential decisions on where to reposition themselves over a planning horizon, so that they can
seek for the next passengers and maximize their individual cumulative rewards. When one idle driver
has to make a sequential decision of repositioning while others are doing so simultaneously, competition
among drivers arises.
Markov decision process (MDP) and reinforcement learning (RL) have become popular tools for
sequential decision-making. Single-agent RL has been used in several studies (Gao et al., 2018; O’Keeffe
et al., 2019) to solve the single-driver repositioning problem. However, single-agent RL assumes each
agent is an independent learner and ignores the impact of competition on each individual agent’s policy.
To capture competition among multiple agents in the process of repositioning, this paper employs a
multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) approach.
Nevertheless, this paper goes beyond simply modeling multi-driver repositioning with MARL. We
notice that every driver plays a non-cooperative game, meaning each driver’s goal is to select a sequence
of reposition strategies to maximize her individual net profit, given other drivers select their own optimal
reposition strategies. Accordingly, the direct application of MARL to the multi-driver system under a
given reward function will likely yield a suboptimal equilibrium for the system, thanks to the selfishness
of drivers. Therefore, the ultimate goal of this paper is to proposes a reward design scheme with which
a more desired equilibrium can be reached. We would like to emphasize the difference between “reward”
and “reward design”. In this paper, the reward for an idle driver is simply the net monetary return
one driver earns, while the reward design scheme is imposed by a higher-level planner (e.g., the TNC
platform or city planners) to modify drivers’ monetary return. Analogous to the role of congestion pricing,
reward design aims to spatially redistribute drivers, driven by individual reward maximization, through
an external cost imposed to those who tend to move towards already oversupplied spots. Under the
external cost, drivers still behave selfish but their movement is now governed by a modified reward, which
consequently balances demand and supply and drives the system towards a more desirable equilibrium.
To justify that reward design can be an effective way of balancing supply and demand, we would like
to briefly introduce our problem set-up below. We assume that each driver, behaving like an intelligent
agent, selects a sequence of optimal reposition policies to maximize its own cumulative reward, which is
the monetary income. Usually a TNC platform charges a commission fee to drivers. Thus, the revenue
a TNC driver receives is an order’s fare minus the commission fee. The TNC platform can adjust the
percentage of fares going to drivers, in order to balance demand and supply. For instance, if the platform
notices that excessive drivers try to move to one hotspot to compete for a limited number of orders,
the platform can increase the commission fee in that grid to prevent oversupply. Drivers are still free to
reposition themselves toward that grid, but adding a higher commission fee would reduce their long-run
accumulative rewards, and accordingly, influence their reposition policies, which hopefully discourage
some drivers from moving to that grid.
1.2. Literature review
In recent years, we have witnessed a growing body of literature on TNC using reinforcement learning,
including pricing mechanism design (Pandey and Boyles, 2018; Pandey et al., 2019), vehicle routing
(Bazzan and Grunitzki, 2016; Nazari et al., 2018; Peng et al., 2020), ride order dispatching (Li et al.,
2019; Tang et al., 2019; Ke et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2019), and driver repositioning (Gao et al., 2018;
Lin et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2020). This study focuses on the multi-driver repositioning task.
The essence of the repositioning task is to provide recommendations to idle drivers on where to find
the next passenger. Some recommender systems have been proposed for drivers (Ge et al., 2010; Hwang
et al., 2015; Yuan et al., 2011; Qu et al., 2014). These studies extracted useful aggregated statistical
quantities such as taxi demand and travel time from historical data and recommended a next cruising
location (Ge et al., 2010), a sequence of potential pickup points (Hwang et al., 2015), a driving route
(Qu et al., 2014), or a route and a location (Yuan et al., 2011). Although the aforementioned studies
provide effective recommendations of the next cruising route or location to drivers at the immediate next
step, they are nearsighted and fall short of capturing the future long-run payoffs. To capture the effect
of future rewards on the recommendation at the immediate next step, various Markov decision process
(MDP) based approaches have been proposed to model idle drivers’ passenger searching process (Rong
et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2018; Verma et al., 2017; Gao et al., 2018; Yu et al., 2019; Shou et al., 2020). In an
MDP, a driver is the agent who makes decisions of where to go next and interacts with the environment.
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The agent aims to derive an optimal policy which maximizes her expected cumulative reward. When
the environment is known to the agent, dynamic programming can be used to solve the MDP and derive
an optimal policy. When the dynamic environment is unknown to the agent, reinforcement learning
(RL) algorithms such as Q-learning and temporal difference learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) can be
employed to derive an optimal policy.
The competition among multiple agents is, however, neglected in the aforementioned MDP models
due to their single-agent setting, resulting in overly optimistic optimal policies. In other words, one agent
cannot earn the full amount of the expected reward by following the policy derived in the single-agent
setting. In a dynamic environment involving a group of agents, multiple agents interact with both the
shared environment and other agents. Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) (Buoniu et al., 2010)
thus fits naturally well in this multi-agent system (MAS). Recently, MARL has been attracting significant
attention due to its success in tackling high dimensional and complicated tasks such as playing the game
of Go (Silver et al., 2016, 2017), Poker (Brown and Sandholm, 2018, 2019), Dota 2 (OpenAI, 2018), and
StarCraft II (Vinyals et al., 2019).
MARL tasks can be broadly grouped into three categories, namely, fully cooperative, fully compet-
itive, and a mix of the two, depending on different applications (Zhang et al., 2019): (1) In the fully
cooperative setting, agents collaborate with each other to optimize a common goal; (2) In the fully com-
petitive setting, agents have competing goals, and the return of agents sums up to zero; (3) The mixed
setting is more like a general-sum game where each agent cooperates with some agents while competes
with others. For instance, in the video game Pong, an agent is expected to be either fully competitive
if its goal is to beat its opponent or fully cooperative if its goal is to keep the ball in the game as long
as possible (Tampuu et al., 2017). A progression from fully competitive to fully cooperative behavior of
agents was also presented in Tampuu et al. (2017) by simply adjusting the reward.
A key challenge arises in MARL when independent agents have no knowledge of other agents, that
is, the theoretical convergence guarantee is no longer applicable since the environment is no longer
Markovian and stationary (Matignon et al., 2012; Nguyen et al., 2018). To tackle this issue, one way is
to exchange some information among agents. In some contexts, agents actually exchange information
with their peers through some coordination. For example, in the game of a team of hunters capturing a
team of preys, Tan (1993) proposed multiple ways to enable coordination among agents and concluded
that the performance of the hunter agents can be better off through some coordination. However, in
other contexts such as the driver repositioning system, agents only have access to their own information.
Thus, information exchange among agents involves a central controller which collects the information
of all agents and disseminates it to agents. Agents update their value functions and policies based on
the provided information from the central controller and their local observations. This is the centralized
learning (i.e., based on global information) and decentralized execution (i.e., based on local observation)
paradigm, which has become increasingly popular in recent research (Foerster et al., 2016; Lowe et al.,
2017; Lin et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019).
While training is stabilized conditioning on the information of other agents such as joint state and
joint action in the centralized training paradigm, scalability becomes a critical issue in MARL because
the joint state space and joint action space grow exponentially with the number of agents. To make
MARL tractable when a large number of agents coexist, Yang et al. (2018) employed the mean field
theory to simplify the interaction among agents. The basic idea is, from the perspective of an agent,
to treat other agents as a mean agent. Thus, the complexity of interactions among a large number
of agents is substantially eased by reducing the dimension in the Q-value function. The large scale
MARL with hundreds of or even thousands of agents becomes solvable. To investigate the large-scale
order dispatching problem where thousands of agents are present, Li et al. (2019) adopted a mean field
approximation and proposed to take the average response from neighboring agents as a proxy of the
interaction between the agent and other agents.
1.3. Research gaps
Recent studies have successfully applied MARL to order dispatching and driver repositioning prob-
lems. Table 1 summarizes these papers in terms of MARL set-up and algorithms. Because this paper is
focused on repositioning, we will mainly highlight the research gaps that exist in the studies on multi-
driver repositioning.
There are a few studies that have employed MARL for the task of driver repositioning (Lin et al.,
2018; Yang et al., 2020). For each time period, based on a difference matrix between the supply and
the predicted demand, Yang et al. (2020) adopted a WoLF (Win or Learn First) policy hill-climbing
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algorithm to reposition cooperative drivers with the goal of balancing demand and supply. Cumulative
reward of drivers over multiple time periods, however, is not optimized. Lin et al. (2018) proposed a
contextual actor-critic model to reposition thousands of drivers with each driver aims to maximize her
cumulative reward. To make training tractable, a global state which includes the overall distribution of
demand and supply is used. Global information, however, may not be obtainable from the perspective of
an agent, especially during execution. To fill the above gaps, this paper aims to tackle the multi-driver
repositioning task only using local observation of each driver.
Although the approaches listed in Table 1 are efficient under a given reward function, the reached
equilibrium is very likely to be suboptimal from the overall perspective of the system. In other words,
there may exist another reward function that yields a better equilibrium in terms of some metrics such
as gross mechandise volume (GMV) and order response rate (ORR) in the context of taxi hailing. One
possible approach to achieve a better equilibrium is to intentionally craft a reward function that is aligned
with the goal of the overall system. For example, Li et al. (2019) proposed the order destination potential
as a component in the reward function to enable some cooperation among drivers and discourage drivers
from being selfish. Human-drivers, however, are selfish in nature and focus on their own monetary return.
Thus, the embeded goal of the system in the predefined reward function may not reflect the intrinsic
interest of drivers, and therefore drivers may not follow the derived optimal policy. To address the above
limitations of a predefined reward function, this study aims to achieve a more desirable equilibrium by
adjusting drivers’ monetary return through some realistic measures of the system. For example, e-hailing
platforms can adjust the platform service charge (aka the commission fee) to achieve a better GMV or
ORR. Likewise, city planners commonly use congestion pricing to drive the traffic system performance
towards a system optimum in transportation network design problems (Yang and H. Bell, 1998; Zhang
and Yang, 2004; Meng and Liu, 2012; Di et al., 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018). We call these measures as
“reward design” mechanism.
In this paper, we show that by integrating a reward design mechanism which adjusts the monetary
return that a driver earns, a desirable equilibrium can be reached in this intrinsically large-scale non-
cooperative system. The desirable equilibrium refers to a Nash equilibrium where each independent and
selfish agent’s strategy is the best-response to other agents’ strategies and will produce better overall
performance of the system. Mguni et al. (2019) proposed a two-layer architecture with an incentive
designer as the upper layer and a potential game as the lower layer and formulated the incentive designer’s
problem as an optimization problem. In contrast, the MARL problem in our context may not be able
to be transformed as a potential game, complicating computation of its equilibrium.
1.4. Contributions of this paper
The major contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. To achieve a better equilibrium for the overall system, a reward design scheme is proposed, formu-
lated as the upper level optimization in a bilevel mathematical program, to adjust drivers’ monetary
return for social optima.
2. With the repositioning task as the lower level in the bilevel mathematical program, a mean field
actor-critic algorithm is employed to enable the learning involving thousands of agents. A Bayesian
optimization algorithm is then developed to solve the bi-level problem.
3. In the case study of taxi driver repositioning under congestion pricing, a multiclass MARL is
developed to capture the intrinsic behavioral difference between yellow taxis and green taxis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section (2) introduces the single-agent actor-critic
algorithm, which is a stepping stone for MARL. Section (3) presents the mean field multi-agent rein-
forcement learning algorithm. Section (4) presents a reward design mechanism and formulates a bilevel
optimization problem. Section (5) presents the result and validates the effectiveness of the proposed
reward design. Section (6) concludes.
2. Single agent reinforcement learning
As a stepping stone, we first introduce the single agent reinforcement learning where only one agent
interacts with the environment.
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2.1. Problem definition
A Markov decision process (MDP) (Puterman, 1994) is typically specified by a tuple (S,A,R, P, γ),
where S denotes the state space, A stands for the allowable actions, R : S×A×S → R collects rewards,
P : S × A × S → [0, 1] denotes a state transition probability from one state to another, and γ ∈ [0, 1]
is a discount factor. A general MDP proceeds simply as follows. Starting from the initial state, the
agent specifies an action a ∈ A whenever the agent is in a state s ∈ S. The agent then transits into
a new state s′ ∈ S with probability P (s′|s, a) and observes an immediate reward r(s, a, s′) by obeying
the dynamics of the environment. Then the process repeats until a terminal state is reached. A policy
pi : S ×A→ [0, 1] simply maps from state s ∈ S to the probability of taking action a ∈ A in state s, i.e.,
pi(a|s). The goal of solving an MDP is to derive an optimal policy pi∗ so that the agent can maximize her
long term expected reward by following the policy. In reinforcement learning problems, the transition
probability matrix P is commonly unknown, and the agent learns about P from its interaction with the
environment.
Denote V pi(s) as the state value, which is the expected cumulative reward that an agent can earn by
starting from state s and following a policy pi. V pi can be recursively given as (Sutton and Barto, 1998)
V pi(s) = Ea∼pi(·|s),s′∼P (·|s,a) [r(s, a, s′) + γV pi(s′)]. Denote Qpi(s, a) as the state-action value, which is
the expected cumulative reward that an agent can earn by starting from state s, taking action a, and
following a policy pi. Qpi is related with V pi through Qpi(s, a) = Es′∼P (·|s,a) [r(s, a, s′) + γV pi(s′)].
The optimal value V can then be written as V (s) = maxpiV
pi(s),∀s ∈ S. The Bellman optimality
equation is given as (Sutton and Barto, 1998):
V (s) = maxaEs′∼P (·|s,a)[r(s, a, s′) + γV (s′)],
where the optimal state-action value is Q(s, a) = Es′∼P (·|s,a)[r(s, a, s′) + γV (s′)].
Our task is then to derive an optimal policy pi∗ (i.e., to solve the MDP) with which the agent can
optimize its expected cumulative reward.
To demonstrate how to formulate an MDP under the context of e-hailing driver reposition, we will
use examples on a 2-by-2 grid world throughout the paper every time when models are introduced.
Example 2.1. (Single-Agent 2 × 2). The single-agent driver reposition is presented in Figure (1). We
adopt a grid world setup where the index of each grid (denoted as l) is shown at the upper left corner.
The taxi icon denotes the driver, and the person icon is the passenger request with the corresponding
fare shown above. The time beneath the driver and the passenger request records the current time of the
driver and the appearance time of the passenger request, respectively. The dashed line with arrow shows
the origin and destination of the passenger request. In addition to the emergence of passenger requests
(i.e., orders), the stochastic environment also has an order dispatching component. Considering that the
scope of this study is driver repositioning instead of order dispatching, we assume passenger requests are
randomly assigned to available drivers within the same grid.
Figure 1: An illustrative example (Single agent)
Note that there are a few studies solving vehicle routing problems based on a physical roadway network
(Liu et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2019). Considering that the research scope of this paper is where to reposition
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drivers, we adopt an abstract network (i.e., a grid world setup). In other words, this paper is more focused
on the direction along which a driver positions herself after dropping of previous passengers and not on
the specific route the driver takes. Using a real network representation for driver-respositioning will be
left for future research.
S. The state of the driver consists of two components, namely, the grid index l and current time t,
i.e., s = (l, t). For instance, the current state of the driver is s = (#3, 0) in this example.
A. The allowable action of the driver is either moving into one of the neighboring grids or staying
within the current grid. To be concise, we use the index of grid where the driver chooses to enter as the
action. Suppose the driver decides to go rightward in the example, then we can denote a = #4. We
further assume it takes the driver one time step to enter grid #4. In other words, the current time of
the driver is t = 1 when the driver arrives in grid #4.
Note. At each time step, a taxi driver can only pick one of the surrounding grids or the current grid
as her preferred spot to find a passenger. In other words, taxi drivers are only allowed local search at
each time step. Although it seems to be restrictive, it is actually consistent with what real drivers do,
and the reason is as follows. From the perspective of a real driver, she can pick a faraway grid as her
destination. However, she can not jump directly from her current grid to that grid. Instead, the driver
needs to specify a route (i.e., a sequence of grids) and repositions herself one grid each time along the
chosen route. If the driver meets a passenger before reaching her chosen destination, she has to take
the passenger because she is not allowed to refuse a fare by law. From the perspective of an agent who
is conducting local search, although she can not choose a faraway grid, she may end up searching in a
faraway grid by repositioning herself one grid at a time. Actually, this definition of action is widely used
in driver repositioning problems in the literature (Rong et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2018; Shou et al., 2020).
P. Considering the driver arrives in grid #4 at time t = 1, and at the same time a passenger request
appears in grid #4 with 80% probability. If this driver is matched to the passenger and picks up the
passenger, the driver will transit to the passenger’s destination, which is grid #2. Denote the transition
time from grid #4 to grid #2 as ∆t#4→#2. We can define the new state s′ = (#2, 1 + ∆t#4→#2).
Then the transition probability from the state s at time 0 to the state s′ at time 1 + ∆t#4→#2 is 80%,
mathematically, P (s′|s, a) = 80%. If there is no passenger request in grid #4 at time t = 1, then the
driver ends up in state s′ = (#4, 1). The transition probably becomes P (s′|s, a) = 20%.
Note. In the temporal component of state s′, we assume searching time is 1, i.e., the time that one idle
driver spent on cruising from her current grid to one of neighbor grids, and use ∆t#4→#2 to denote the
time that one on-duty driver spent on transporting the passenger to the destination. Actually, the travel
time from passenger’s origin to the destination is extracted from some historical data. In addition, the
length of each time slice is 1 in this example.
R. If we take the fare of the fulfilled passenger request as the reward, r(s, a, s′) = $7 in the example.
Based on the received reward at this step and the future cumulative reward, the driver chooses an action
in the new state s′, and the state transition process repeats until a terminal state (i.e., t = T where T
is a predefined ending time, say, the end of the driver’s work time) is reached.
2.2. Actor-Critic method
To solve optimal policies, there are two types of methods, namely, value based or critic-only method
and policy based or actor-only method. Value based and policy based methods are commonly used termi-
nologies, but from now on we will use critic-only and actor-only methods for the purpose of introducing
the actor-critic method.
Critic-only methods aim to output the optimal policy pi through optimizing the state-action Q(s, a)
or the state value V (s). Actor-only methods directly output an optimal policy pi without resorting to
stored value functions Q(s, a) or V (s) as an intermediary. Both methods have pros and cons. Critic-only
methods enjoy a low variance in the estimate of the state-action value but may lack guarantees on the
optimality or near-optimality of the resulting policy if an optimal policy cannot be easily solved from
value functions. Actor-only methods work well on continuous and large action spaces but may suffer
from high fluctuation in policies (Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003; Grondman et al., 2012). To overcome the
shortcomings of these methods, actor-critic methods are developed to combine strengths of both methods
(Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003).
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Figure 2: Actor-critic algorithm
Figure (2) presents the architecture of the actor-critic algorithm. One agent, who has an actor and a
critic, interacts with the environment. The agent observes its state s from the environment and inputs s
to the actor that outputs the policy, i.e., a probability distribution over all possible actions. The agent
samples an action a from the probability distribution and takes action a in the environment. Then the
agent observes a state transition s → s′ and receives a reward r from the environment. Based on the
one-step transition s → s′ as well as action a and reward r, the agent updates its critic. With the
updated Q-value Qθ(s, a), the agent updates its actor using policy gradient. Now we detail both the
critic and the actor, respectively.
Critic. The critic takes as input state s and action a and outputs Q-value Q(s, a). Q-learning is the
most commonly used algorithm to update the Q value based on the state transition s→ s′ with reward
r(s, a, s′) and updates the Q-value by
Q(s, a)← Q(s, a) + η[r(s, a, s′) + γmaxa′Q(s′, a′)−Q(s, a)] (1)
where η is the learning rate and 0 < η ≤ 1. If η reduces over time properly, the Q-learning update
converges (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Equation (1), however, is only applicable to a finite and discrete
state and action space. In other words, one needs to maintain a Q table with all possible combinations
of s and a, which is not tractable for a continuous and large state and action space. Therefore we need
functional approximation to the original Q-value. Deep neural network, i.e., deep Q network (DQN),
is one of the most popular value approximator (Mnih et al., 2015). Denote a deep neural network
parameterized by θ as Qθ(s, a), to approximate Q(s, a). DQN updates its parameter θ by minimizing
the loss
L(θ) = Es,a,s′ [(r(s, a, s′) + γmaxa′Qθ−(s′, a′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
target
−Qθ(s, a))2]. (2)
This problem can be solved by the gradient descent method, whose gradient is straightforward to compute
as follows: ∇θL(θ) = Es,a,s′ [−∇θQθ(s, a)×(r(s, a, s′)+γmaxa′Qθ−(s′, a′)−Qθ(s, a))], where the gradient
is not taken with respect to the target. Qθ− is a target network which is a copy of Qθ. The target network
Qθ− is not updated by the gradient descent and is copied from Qθ after a certain number of steps to
ensure training stability (Mnih et al., 2015).
Actor. The actor takes as input state s and outputs a probability distribution on all allowable actions in
this state. Similar to how we use a value network to approximate Q-value, we can also use a deep neural
network, i.e., policy network, to approximate the policy pi. Denote the policy network parameterized
by φ as piφ(a|s). The goal of the actor is to maximize its expected cumulative reward, denoted as
ρ(piφ) =
∑T
t=0 γ
trt, where rt is the reward the actor receives at time t. To solve the optimal policy of
the actor requires us to know its gradient. The gradient of the policy is complicated to solve and is given
as (Sutton et al., 1999)
∇φρ(piφ) = Es,a[(Qθ−(s, a)− bθ−(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
advantage
)∇φlog(piφ(a|s))], (3)
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where bθ− is some baseline (e.g., bθ− = Vθ− , i.e., the value function following the policy Vθ−), and
Qθ−(s, a)− bθ−(s) is called the advantage of a taken action a, a measure of the goodness of an action. If
it is greater than zero, it means this taken action is generally good, otherwise it may be bad. Naturally,
the underlying rationale in computing the policy gradient defined in Equation (3) is to update the policy
distribution to concentrate on potentially good action(s). When the chosen action a leads to a positive
advantage, i.e., Qθ−(s, a)− bθ−(s) > 0, the policy is updated towards the direction of favoring action a.
When the advantage is negative for action a, the policy is updated in the direction of against action a.
To summarize, in addition to the policy network piφ, the actor-critic algorithm also maintains a value
network Qθ so that the calculation of the gradient of the policy in Equation (3) directly uses the Q-
function approximator Qθ, to ensure stability of policy update. The actor-critic algorithm simultaneously
updates critic (by minimizing the loss given in Equation (2)) and the actor (by the gradient given in
Equation (3)) as more samples are fed in.
3. Multi-agent reinforcement learning
To tackle a real-world problem with multiple agents, the aforementioned single agent reinforcement
learning falls short of capturing the coupling effects or the competition among multiple agents. In this
section, we introduce a multi-agent reinforcement learning approach to model the multi-driver reposi-
tioning task. Drivers are assumed to be intelligent and perfectly rational, meaning they select the best
repositioning strategies to maximize their cumulative rewards. Bounded rationality (Di et al., 2013; Di
and Liu, 2016) is left for future research.
3.1. Problem definition
The multi-agent problem is modeled as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP)
(Littman, 1994), defined by a tuple (S,O1, O2, · · · , ON , A1, A2, · · · , AN , P,R1, R2, · · · , RN , N, γ), where
N is the number of agents and S is the environment state space. Environment state s ∈ S is not
fully observable. Instead, agent i draws a private observation oi ∈ Oi which is correlated with s. Oi
is the observation space of agent i, yielding a joint observation space O = O1 × O2,× · · · × ON , Ai
is the action space of agent i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, yielding a joint action space A = A1 × A2 × · · · × AN ,
P : S ×A× S → [0, 1] is the state transition probability, Ri : S ×A× S → R is the reward function for
agent i, and γ is the discount factor.
Agent i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} uses a policy pii : Oi×Ai → [0, 1] to choose actions after drawing observation
oi. After all agents taking actions, the joint action a triggers a state transition s→ s′ based on the state
transition probability P (s′|s,a). Agent i draws a private observation o′i corresponding to s′ and receives
a reward ri(s,a, s
′). Agent i aims to maximize its discounted expected cumulative reward by deriving an
optimal policy pi∗i which is the best response to other agents’ policies. This process repeats until agents
reach their own terminal state.
Due to the existence of other agents, the Q-value function for agent i , i.e., Qi, is now dependent on
the environment state s ∈ S and the joint action a ∈ A of all agents, i.e,
Qi = Qi(s,a). (4)
Similarly, the value function of agent i, i.e., Vi = Vi(s), is dependent on the environment state s.
Subsequently, we will demonstrate how to formulate the multi-driver repositioning problem in MARL,
building on the single-agent example developed in the previous section.
Example 3.1. (Multi-Agent 2× 2). The multi-agent driver reposition is presented in Figure (3). Same
as before, a grid world setup is adopted. Now we have two drivers with their indices shown above the
taxi icon and two passenger requests with fare presented above the passenger icon. The time beneath
drivers and passenger requests records the current time of the driver and the appearance time of the
passenger request, respectively. The dashed line with arrow shows the origin and destination of the
passenger request.
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Figure 3: An illustrative example (Multi agent)
N. There are N = 2 drivers moving around in the environment. We denote drivers by {1, 2}.
S. The environmental state consists state information of both drivers. For driver i, her state si is
composed of her current location li (i.e., the grid index based on a grid world setup) and current time t,
i.e., si = (li, t). The joint state of both drivers, i.e., the environment state s ∈ S, at time t is denoted as
s = (s1, s2). In this example, at current time t = 0, s = ((#3, 0), (#2, 0)).
A. For driver i, her action ai ∈ Ai can be any of the five possible actions, i.e., moving into any of her
four neighboring grids or staying in the current grid. The same as before, we use the index of grid where
the driver chooses to enter as the action. The joint action of both drivers is a = (a1, a2). Assuming
driver 1 decides to go rightward (i.e, to enter grid #4) and driver 2 chooses to go leftward (i.e., to enter
grid #1), the joint action is a = (#4,#1). We further assume it then takes driver 1 one time step to
enter grid #4 and driver 2 one time step to enter grid #1. In other words, after driver 1 arrives in grid
#4 and driver 2 arrives in grid #1, the clock ticks one step forward and the current time is now t = 1.
P. The joint action a triggers a state transition s→ s′ with some probability according to the state
transition function, i.e., P (s|s′,a). Driver 1 gets matched to the passenger request in grid #4 at t = 1,
loads up the passenger, and drives to the destination of the passenger. Driver 1 then arrives in a new
state s′1 = (#2, 1 + ∆t#4→#2) where ∆t#4→#2 is the transition time from grid #4 to grid #2. Similarly,
driver 2 gets matched to the passenger request in grid #1 at t = 1, loads up the passenger, and drives
to the destination of the passenger. Driver 2 then arrives in a new state s2 = (#3, 1 + ∆t#1→#3) where
∆t#1→#3 is the transition time from grid #1 to grid #3. s′ = ((#2, 1 + ∆t#4→#2), (#3, 1 + ∆t#1→#3)).
In this simple example, P (s′|s,a) = 1 due to the deterministic appearance of passenger requests.
R. Along with the state transition, each driver receives a reward, i.e., ri. The reward function ri for
each agent i ∈ {1, 2} is simply the fare of the fulfilled passenger request, i.e., r1 = $7 and r2 = $3.
This example will be revisited later in this section to illustrate the algorithm.
3.2. Techniques to simplify the Q-value function
The dependency of the Q-value of an agent i on other agents’ states and actions, as shown in Equa-
tion (4), however, introduces prohibitively high difficulties in learning the optimal Q-value. The main
reasons are two-fold. First, although each agent draws its private observation oi from the environment
state s, s cannot be observed by any agent, i.e., s is unknown. Second, one agent does not observe the
actual actions taken by all agents, i.e., a is unknown.
To make the Q-value of an agent in the multi-agent system tractable, the dependency of the Q-value
on the environment state s and joint action a needs to be simplified. A very natural approach, inspired
by the single-agent setting, is independent learning where each agent i only has information about its
own observation oi and action ai but has no information about other agents. Thus, the Q-value function
of agent i is reduced to
Qi = Qi(oi, ai). (5)
In other words, private observations and joint action of other agents are not used by agent i. After all
agents choosing actions, the joint action a triggers a state transition. Agent i then draws a new private
observation o′i and receives a reward ri.
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The independent learning algorithm, although is intuitive and simple, can be unstable and hard to
reach convergence since the environment is no longer Markovian and stationary due to the appearance
of other agents (Matignon et al., 2012).
3.2.1. Centralized training and decentralized execution
To make the training more stable and ensure convergence, we employ the centralized training and
decentralized execution paradigm (Foerster et al., 2016; Lowe et al., 2017; Lin et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019).
In this paradigm, to train the policy of agents, we assume these agents know the global information such
as the joint observation and/or joint action. In other words, in addition to observation oi and action ai,
agent i also has access to the observations and/or actions of other agents during training. While in the
execution phase, decentralized testing or execution is implemented, meaning they would not have access
to the global information anymore. To realize this paradigm, the aforementioned actor-critic algorithm
naturally fits in, because we can apply global information to the critic, i.e., joint observation and joint
action in Qi, in the training phase, while feeding local information to the actor, i.e., oi in pii, in the
execution phase. Decentralized execution becomes possible because only actors are used in execution.
Then the Q-value function of agent i becomes
Qi = Qi(oi, o−i, ai, a−i), (6)
where o−i = (o1, · · · , oi−1, oi+1, · · · , oN ) and a−i = (a1, · · · , ai−1, ai+1, · · · , aN ) denote the joint obser-
vation and joint action of all agents except agent i, respectively.
In the context of e-hailing driver repositioning, considering the definition of the action, which is the
index of the grid where the driver chooses to enter, the Q-value function of driver i, i.e., Qi, does not
depend on the joint observation of other drivers, i.e., o−i. Explanations are as follows. When driver i
chooses action ai = l based on its observation oi, driver i then enters grid l. At the same time, other
drivers also enter some grid based on their joint action a−i regardless of their joint observation o−i.
The Q-value function of driver i only depends on the current distribution of drivers, which has been
determined by their joint action a−i. Therefore it is the joint action a−i which affects Qi. The Q-value
function is thus further reduced to
Qi = Qi(oi, ai, a−i). (7)
3.2.2. Mean field approximation
The centralized training and decentralized execution paradigm, however, can easily become in-
tractable due to the exponential increase in the joint action space with the increasing number of agents.
For example, the size of the joint action space easily blows up for N agents with |A| possible actions (i.e.,
|A|N possibilities). To simplify the interaction among agents, we adopt the mean field approximation.
The basic idea of the mean field approximation is to simplify the complicated interaction between one
agent and all other agents by a pairwise interaction between the agent and a virtual mean agent which
is formed by the neighboring agents of the agent. Thus, the complexity of interactions among a large
number of agents is substantially eased by reducing the dimension in the input of the Q-value function.
Therefore the large scale MARL with hundreds of or even thousands of agents becomes solvable.
To be more precise, we provide brief explanations that lead to the applicability of the mean field
approximation in MARL as described in Yang et al. (2018). First, from the perspective of agent i, the
multi-agent effect or competition effect mainly comes from its neighboring agents, i.e., Qi(oi, ai, a−i) ≈
1
Ni
∑
k∈N(i)Qi(oi, ai, ak), where N(i) denotes the neighboring agents of agent i. However, it is still
cumbersome to compute Qk, k ∈ N(i) for the neighboring agents of agent i if this number is large.
Define a mean action a¯i, which is a proxy of the actions taken by the neighboring agents. Accordingly,
Qi(oi, ai, a−i) can be further simplified to Qi(oi, ai, a¯i) when Taylor expansion is applied, which is
Qi ≈ 1
Ni
∑
k∈N(i)
Qi(oi, ai, ak) ≈ Qi(oi, ai, a¯i). (8)
Interested readers can refer to Yang et al. (2018) for a detailed explanation and proof.
Example 3.2. (Multi-Agent 2× 2). The mean action a¯i of the neighboring drivers of driver i is defined
as the demand to supply ratio in the grid where driver i is entering. Assuming both drivers choose action
#4, i.e., a1 = a2 = #4 in the multi-agent 2 × 2 example shown in Figure (3), there are 2 drivers and
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1 passenger request in grid #4 after both drivers enter grid #4. The mean action for both drivers is
thus a¯1 = a¯2 =
1
2 = 0.5. This definition of mean action captures the level of competition in a grid. A
larger mean action a¯i denotes a higher demand to supply ratio and lower level of competition, and vice
versa.
3.3. Mean field actor-critic algorithm
As previously mentioned, each agent i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} maintains a policy network pii (i.e., the actor)
and a Q-value network Qi (i.e., the critic). For a real-world multi-agent task, however, there are typically
hundreds of or even thousands of agents, resulting in a prohibitively large number of deep neural networks
to maintain, which is not computationally tractable. To address this issue, we assume drivers are
homogeneous and they share the same state space, action space, and reward function. We believe
this assumption is reasonable when agents are anonymous and one’s influence to the entire system
performance is negligible. While heterogeneity across agents does exist when agents have different reward
functions (Shou et al., 2020), this study aims to reveal some insights of multi-driver repositioning by
learning a policy for the generic taxi population. A more personalized reposition scheme that captures
the heterogeneity across the driver population is left for future research.
The multi-agent task can then be largely simplified by sharing both the actor and the critic among
drivers, i.e., Q1 = Q2 = · · · = QN = Q and pi1 = pi2 = · · ·piN = pi.
After adopting the mean field approximation, the loss function for the critic, which was presented in
Equation (2) for the single-agent setting, now becomes
L(θ) = Eoi,ai,o′i(r(oi, ai, o′i) + γmaxa′iEa¯′i [Qθ−(o′i, a′i, a¯′i)]−Qθ(oi, ai, a¯i))2. (9)
The only difference is the incorporation of the mean action a¯ into the Q-value function approximation.
Similarly, the gradient of the policy, which was presented in Equation (3) for single-agent setting, is now
∇φρ(piφ) = Eoi,ai [(Ea¯[Qθ−(oi, ai, a¯i)]− V (oi))∇φlog(piφ(ai|oi))], (10)
where the baseline V (oi) = Eai,a¯i [Qθ−(oi, ai, a¯i)].
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Algorithm 1 Mean field actor-critic algorithm
1: Input: exploration parameter  = 0, target network update period τ , learning rate η = η0, and a
preset number of samples K
2: Initialize a deep neural network Qθ(o, a, a¯), parameterized by θ, for the critic and a deep neural
network piφ(a|o), parameterized by φ, for the actor
3: Initialize a target Q-value network Qθ− with parameter θ
− = θ and a target policy network piφ−
with φ− = φ
4: Initialize a replay buffer B
5: Set I = 0
6: repeat
7: Randomly initialize a starting grid for all agents, and each agent i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} draws a private
observation oi
8: Set t = 0
9: repeat
10: Sample a value x from a uniform distribution which is defined on [0, 1]
11: if x <  then
12: Select an action ai from the allowable action space randomly for all available agents
13: else
14: Select an action ai greedily according to the policy piφ− for all available agents
15: end if
16: Each available agent takes its action ai, observes a reward ri and a mean action a¯i, and draws
a new observation o′i
17: Store the experience tuple {oi, ai, ri, a¯i, o′i} into the replay buffer B
18: t← t+ 1
19: until t = T
20: Sample K sample experience tuples from the buffer B
21: Update the critic Q by minimizing the loss defined Equation (9)
22: Update the actor pi using the gradient defined in Equation (10)
23: Decrease the exploration parameter 
24: Decrease the learning rate η
25: I = I + 1
26: if I mod τ = 0 then
27: Update the parameter of target networks, i.e., θ− ← θ and φ− ← φ
28: end if
29: until the algorithm converges
30: Return the optimal policy pi
The mean field actor-critic algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. With the input of some parameters
such as the exploration parameter , target network update period τ , and learning rate η, and a preset
number of samples K, a neural network Qθ for the critic and a neural network piφ for the actor are
initialized. Target networks Qθ− and piφ− are copied from Qθ and piφ, respectively. An experience replay
buffer B is also initialized to store experience tuples of all agents. Now we let agents repetitively interact
with the environment and update the actor and the critic as follows. Agents are randomly placed in the
environment initially. All agents choose actions according to the -greedy method. That is, agents have
 probability of choosing actions randomly and 1 −  probability of choosing actions according to the
target policy network piφ− . Each agent i then executes the chosen action ai in the environment, observes
a reward ri and a mean action a¯i, and draws a new observation o
′
i. This experience tuple {oi, ai, ri, a¯i, o′i}
is stored in the replay buffer B. All idle agents then choose actions again and repeat the aforementioned
procedure until reaching the terminal state with t = T . After collecting experience tuples of all agents,
K sample experience tuples are randomly sampled from the replay buffer B and used to train neural
networks Qθ and piφ by Equations (9) and (10).
Example 3.3. (Multi-Agent 2 × 2). Now we apply the mean field actor-critic algorithm to the multi-
driver example shown in Figure (3). Figure (4) presents the architecture of the mean field actor-critic
algorithm particularly for the context of multi-driver repositioning. Homogeneous agents, who share a
common actor and a common critic, interact with the environment. The shared actor is a multilayer
perceptron with 32 neurons in its hidden layer and takes as input observation oi and outputs a five
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dimensional vector denoting the probability distribution of taking five actions. Similarly, the shared
critic takes as input (oi, ai, a¯i) and outputs the Q-value. During training, agent i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} draws
its private observation oi from the environment and inputs oi to the actor which outputs a probability
distribution over actions. Agent i samples an action ai from the probability distribution and takes the
sampled action in the environment. Joint action of all agents a triggers a state transition s → s′ in
the environment. Agent i then observes the mean action a¯i, draws a new observation o
′
i, and receives
a reward ri from the environment. The agent then uses (oi, ai, o
′
i, ri, a¯i) to update the shared critic by
minimizing the loss presented in Equation (9). Based on the advantage calculated from the critic, agent
i updates the shared actor using the gradient presented in Equation (10).
The aforementioned training process is centralized because the mean action used in the critic is
actually some global information. During execution, agents only need to use the updated actor, which
only takes as input the local information, i.e., the private observation. In other words, the shared critic
is not used in execution.
Figure 4: Mean field actor-critic algorithm for multi-driver repositioning
The derived Q values corresponding to four scenarios of interest are presented in Figure (5). In
Figure (5a), when both drivers choose action #4, the observed mean action for both of them is the ratio
of demand to supply, i.e., a¯1 = a¯2 =
1 passenger request
2 drivers
= 0.5. The resulting expected value for both
drivers is $3.5, i.e., Q(o1, a1, a¯1) = Q(o2, a2, a¯2) = 3.5, because both of them have an equal probability
1 driver
2 drivers
= 50% to take the passenger request with $7. Similarly, the observed mean actions and resulting
Q values can be explained in other scenarios. The Q-value bimatrix is presented in Table (2) where driver
1 is the column player and driver 2 is the row player. When driver 1 chooses action #1 and driver 2
chooses action #1, Q-values for them are 1.5 and 1.5, respectively, according to Figure (5d). Similarly,
Q-values for both drivers can be read from Figure (5) for other scenarios. Based on the bimatrix, driver
1 always chooses action #4 because action #4 is strictly better than action #1 regardless of the observed
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mean action, and driver 2 always chooses action #4 for the same reason. Thus, the optimal policy for
both drivers is to enter grid #4 with an expected payoff $3.5.
(a) Both drivers take action #4 (b) Driver 1 takes action #4 and driver 2 takes action
#1
(c) Driver 1 takes action #1 and driver 2 takes action
#4
(d) Both drivers take action #1
Figure 5: Derived Q values for four scenarios of interest
Table 2: Q-value bimatrix for drivers
Driver 1
#1 #4
Driver 2
#1 1.5, 1.5 (Figure 5d) 7, 3 (Figure 5b)
#4 3, 7 (Figure 5c) 3.5, 3.5 (Figure 5a)
4. Reward design for multi-agent reinforcement learning
Due to selfishness of each agent, performing MARL under a given reward function in an MAS is
very likely to yield an undesirable equilibrium from the perspective of the system. In other words, this
equilibrium may not be an optimum with respect to some system objectives. To guide an MAS towards
a desirable equilibrium, system planners could resort to reward design mechanisms by modifying the
reward function of agents. In this paper, we introduce a new parameter α ∈ A into agents’ reward,
where A is the feasible domain of α. Parameter α can be either a scalar or a vector. The goal of system
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planners is to maximize some system performance measure dependent of α, denoted as f(α). The system
planner first chooses a value of α and inputs it to the MAS. With the given α that influences the reward
design, the developed mean field actor-critic algorithm is employed to derive an optimal policy pi, which
is dependent on α, for all agents in the system. Some performance measure f , which is calculated by
executing the derived optimal policy pi for all agents, is then fed into the reward design. The performance
measure f is dependent on α through the dependency of pi on α. In other words, f = f(α).
In summary, the reward design problem is to select a parameter α to maximize the performance
measure f(α) on the upper level, while the distributed agents aim to maximize their individual cumulative
rewards on the lower level once α is given as part of their reward. This process can be formulated as a
bi-level optimization problem, mathematically,
maxα∈Af(α) (11)
where
maxpi
T∑
k=t
γk−trki (α), ∀t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , T}, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
The interaction between upper and lower levels through exchange of variables is shown in Figure (6).
Figure 6: Architecture of the reward design
The optimization problem presented in Equation (11), however, is not straightforward to solve due
to the unknown complex structure of f over the parameter α. Traditional gradient based methods such
as gradient descent are thus no longer applicable. In addition, the black-box function f is expensive to
evaluate, meaning that evaluating one value of α can take a long period of time. Therefore random or
grid search based optimization techniques (Bergstra and Bengio, 2012) are less effective because they
typically require a large number of evaluations.
To find optima with a limited number of evaluations, we adopt Bayesian optimization (Mockus, 1989)
(hereafter we call it BO). Due to the unknown structure of the objective function f , BO places a prior
on the objective function, for example a Gaussian process (GP). With some observed data (i.e., several
evaluations of α’s), BO derives a posterior, based on which the next α to be evaluated can then be
determined.
We now detail the procedure of BO in our context. First, BO places a prior statistical model on
the objective function f , for example a GP in this study. A GP is a stochastic process satisfing the
following conditions: 1) For any α ∈ A, f(α) is a random variable; 2) For a collection of any finite
number of α’s (i.e., α1, α2, · · · , and αm ∀m ∈ R), the joint distribution f = [f(α1), f(α2), · · · , f(αm)]T
is a multivariate Gaussian. Mathematically,
f ∼ N (µ,K),
where µ is a m by 1 mean vector and K is a m by m covariance matrix with each entry Kij denoting
the covariance between f(αi) and f(αj). A square exponential kernel κ(αi, αj) is used to calculate the
covariance Kij and is defined as
κ(αi, αj) = σ
2
fe
− 1
2l2
(αi−αj)2 ,
where l is the length parameter and σf the variance parameter. The square exponential kernel yields a
large covariance when αi and αj are close (i.e., (αi − αj)2 is small) and a small covariance when αi and
αj are far away (i.e., (αi−αj)2 is large), which is as expected because for a typical function f , f(αi) and
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f(αj) are similar when αi and αj are similar, meaning a large covariance. The prior used in this study
is a GP with a zero mean (i.e., µ = 0) and a covariance matrix K calculated by the aforementioned
square exponential kernel.
Second, with a given prior and some observed data, now our task is to derive a posterior probability
distribution of f∗ = [f∗1 , f
∗
2 , · · · , f∗m]T at some α∗ = [α∗1, α∗2, · · · , α∗m]T . We assume f = [f1, f2, · · · , fn]T
is the observed data at some α = [α1, α2, · · · , αn]T . By the definition of a GP, the joint distribution
(f ,f∗) is a multivariate Gaussian. Mathematically, the prior probability distribution of (f ,f∗) with
zero mean is [
f
f∗
]
∼ N
([
0n
0m
]
,
[
Kn×n K∗n×m
K∗Tm×n K
∗∗
m×m
])
,
where 0n is n-dimensional vector with all entries as zeros, 0m m-dimensional vector with all entries as
zeros, K a n by n covariance matrix with each entry Kij = κ(αi, αj) + σ
2
yδij (σy is the noise in the
observed data and δij is the Kronecker delta), K
∗ a n by m matrix with each entry K∗ij = κ(αi, α
∗
j ),
and K∗∗ a m by m matrix with each entry K∗∗ij = κ(α
∗
i , α
∗
j ). According to the multivariate Gaussian
theorem (Murphy, 2012), the probability distribution of f∗ conditioned on the observed f is
p(f∗|f) ∼ N (µ∗,Σ∗) , (12)
where µ∗ = K∗TK−1f and Σ∗ = K∗∗ −K∗TK−1K∗.
Third, with the derived posterior probability distribution of f∗ conditioned on the seen data f , we
now aim to define an acquisition function, based on which the next α to be evaluated can be determined.
The acquisition function used in this study is the upper confidence bound (UCB) (Srinivas et al., 2010),
i.e.,
UCB(α) = µ∗(α) +
√
2log(td/2+2pi2/3δ)σ∗(α), (13)
where µ∗(α) is the posterior mean at α, σ∗(α) the posterior standard deviation at α (derived from Σ∗),
d is the dimension of the search space of α, and δ is a parameter. The next α′ to be evaluated is simply
α′ = arg max
α∈A
UCB(α). (14)
Remark. With the acquisition function defined as UCB in Equation (13), it has been shown that BO
is no regret with high probability and has a lower-bound on the convergence rate (Brochu et al., 2010).
Interested readers are referred to Srinivas et al. (2010); Brochu et al. (2010); Berkenkamp et al. (2019)
for more details on global optimality and convergence properties of BO.
The pseudo-code of BO used in this study is listed in Algorithm (2).
Algorithm 2 Bayesian Optimization
1: Initialize a GP prior with zero mean on the objective function f
2: Set computational budget B, a initial number of evaluations b0, and b = b0
3: Evaluate f at b0 randomly chosen α’s, i.e., f = [f(α1), f(α2), · · · , f(αb0)]
4: while b ≤ B do
5: Calculate the posterior probability distribution of f∗ conditioned on f by Equation (12)
6: Calculate the acquisition function UCB by Equation (13) with t = b
7: Locate the next α′ to be evaluated by Equation (14)
8: Evaluate f at α′ and append f(α′) to f
9: b← b+ 1
10: end while
11: Return α that maximizes f
To be more concrete, now we use the multi-agent 2× 2 example presented in Figure (3) to illustrate
the potential of the reward design.
Example 4.1. (Multi-Agent 2×2). We take the order response rate (ORR), i.e. the ratio of the number
of fulfilled passenger requests to the total number of passenger requests, as the performance measure
of the system. The direct application of mean field actor-critic algorithm yields a 50% ORR, which is
obviously not the desired equilibrium from the perspective of the system. Noticing that the platform
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typically charges a certain proportion of the fare paid by the passenger as the so-called platform service
charge, which is reportedly to be dependent on various factors such as distance, duration, and city. We
aim to improve the performance of the system by devising a proper reward design.
In Figure (3), trip fares are shown right above each passenger request, the reached equilibrium for
both drivers without any charge are to enter grid #4 and get an expected reward as $3.5, leading to an
oversupply (i.e., a low demand to supply ratio) in grid #4 and an undersupply (i.e., a high demand to
supply ratio) in grid #1, which is not beneficial for the system. A reward design which deducts $1.1
from the passenger request paid to the driver in grid #4 will effectively attract one driver to leave grid
#4 for grid #1 to get more monetary return, resulting in a 100% order response rate.
5. Case Study
To test the performance of the proposed bilevel optimization model, we use two datasets including a
synthetic dataset and one real-world large-scale taxi dataset downloadable from official website of New
York City (NYC) Taxi & Limousine Commission (https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/about/tlc-trip-record-
data.page).
5.1. E-hailing driver repositioning under service charge
We first test the bilevel optimization model on a 2-by-2 grid world example, where an analytical
solution of the reward design can be derived. Then we compare both values to justify the correctness of
our BO algorithm.
5.1.1. Lower level MARL setup
The dataset consists of seven deterministic passenger requests in a 2-by-2 grid world setup, as shown
in Figure (7). At t = 0, there are fifty idle drivers in grid #2 and fifty in grid #3. At time t = 1, fifty
passenger requests with fare $10 deterministically appear in grid #4 and twenty passenger requests with
fare $4.9 appear in grid #1. The observation space for driver i consists of the grid index and current
time, i.e., oi = (li, t), and the action space is to enter one of neighboring grids or to stay at the current
grid. The reward that a driver earns is her monetary return. That is,
r = fare× (1− SCl),
where SCl is the service charge in percentage if the driver takes the passenger request in grid l. SCl is
defined later in Equation (15).
Figure 7: Layout
5.1.2. Upper level objective function
Without any reward design, the optimal policy for all drivers is to enter grid #4, because the expected
return for entering grid #4 is at least $5 (i.e., 100 drivers compete for 50 orders with $10 each) while that
for entering grid #1 is at most $4.9 (i.e., the highest fare of an order in #1 is $4.9). The resulting ORR
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is 50/70 = 71.43%, which is not desirable from the perspective of the platform because it is expected
to achieve a 100% ORR in this setting. Actually, the platform can achieve a better ORR by adjusting
the reward that drivers earn through the use of a platform service charge (aka the commission fee). The
platform service charge used in this study is denoted as a fare percentage. For instance, a 10% service
charge means the platform takes 10% of the fare paid by the passenger to the driver as its revenue.
In other words, the driver gets less money under a higher service charge while the payment from the
passenger remains the same. To achieve a better ORR, the platform needs to place a high service charge
in grids which are oversupplied. Drivers oversupply grid l because on average they can earn more by
entering grid l, compared with entering other grids. A high service charge placed in grid l can effectively
reduce monetary returns for drivers entering l and make grid l less attractive to drivers. Thus, some
drivers choose other grids and take other passenger requests, resulting in an increase in ORR.
Before introducing a functional form of the platform service charge, we formly provide two notations,
namely demand to supply ratio (DS) and service charge (SC). We then construct an effective form of
SC as a function of DS. A small DS indicates that the grid is oversupplied, and a large DS means the
grid is undersupplied. The goal of the platform is to drive DS close to 1, meaning a balance between
demand and supply. In a grid l with DSl below 1, SCl is expected to be large to discourage drivers from
oversupplying the grid; while in a grid l with DSl above 1, SCl is supposed to be small. To illustrate
such a relation, we use a piecewise linear function with a parameter α as SC in grid l, i.e.,
SCl =
{
α× (1−DSl) if DSl ≤ 1,
0 otherwise,
(15)
where a relatively high SC is charged to all drivers in the grid with a low DS and no SC is charged to
drivers in the grid with DS above 1. Parameter α is the SC at DSl = 0.
With an adjustable parameter α, the platform aims to maximize some objective f consisting of two
components, namely ORR and overall service charge (OSC), as
f = w ×ORR + (1− w)× (1−OSC). (16)
OSC is defined as
OSC =
∑
l
∑
order∈serviced orders 1orderorigin∈l × SCl × fareorder∑
order∈serviced orders fareorder
,
where the denominator is the total amount of fare of all serviced orders and the numerator is the total
amount of service charge.
The rationale of choosing these two components is as follows. First, from the perspective of the
platform, it aims to maximize ORR, because a larger ORR typically means a higher revenue and a higher
customer satisfaction. To maximize ORR, the platform simply chooses the largest possible value of α.
The reason is that with the largest possible α, the platform penalizes drivers heavily for oversupplying
a grid, and therefore drivers will be directed to other grids. This strategy, i.e., choosing the largest α,
however, is a big threat for the long-term growth of the platform because drivers are very likely to quit
under such a high service charge. Thus, the platform also needs to maintain a relatively small OSC.
Considering the competition between ORR and OSC, we use a weighted average of ORR and (1−OSC)
as the objective of the platform, i.e., where w ∈ [0, 1] is the weight for ORR. In this case study, we set
w = 35 , meaning that the platform cares more about ORR.
5.1.3. Results
We then use two methods, namely BO and an analytical method, to determine the optimal value of
α.
1. BO. We first employ BO with the objective function given in Equation (16). When we apply the
mean field actor-critic algorithm to the lower level MAS, the critic is parameterized by a multilayer
perceptron (MLP) with three hidden layers (64, 32, 16), and the actor is parameterized by an MLP
with three hidden layers (32, 16, 8). ReLU is used as the activation function between hidden layers,
and a softmax function is used to transform the final output from the actor to be a probability
distribution. Learning rates η for both the actor and the critic are 10−4. Discount factor γ = 1
under the assumption that drivers typically do not depreciate their monetary income on the same
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day. Exploration parameter is initially set as 0 = 0.5 and linearly decreases over iterations until it
reaches a minimum value of 0.01. The target network update period is τ = 10, meaning that the
parameters of target networks are updated every 10 episodes.
For a bilevel optimization problem, first we need to check the convergence of the lower level. As an
example to validate the convergence, ORR, (1 - OSC), and the average reward of all drivers (i.e.,
Reward in Figure (8)) versus the index of episodes are presented in Figure (8) with α = 0.5 and
α = 1.0. In both scenarios, ORR and reward increase very fast and (1 - OSC) steadily decreases
during the first 500 episodes where agents explore the environment and learn the optimal policy.
ORR, (1 - OSC), and reward gradually converge after 1,500 episodes when agents mainly exploit
the knowledge they have gained through their previous explorations.
(a) α = 0.5 (b) α = 1.0
Figure 8: Convergence of the lower level MARL
(a) Posterior probability distribution of f conditioned
on the initial five evaluated points
(b) Acquisition function (UCB)
Figure 9: Posterior probability distribution and acquisition function at iteration 0
With the validated convergence of the lower level MARL, we now run BO to solve the bilevel
optimization problem. As for the initial value of α, in addition to 0 and 1 (i.e., both ends of the
interval of interest), we randomly sample three other values according to a uniform distribution.
In total we evaluate five α’s as the starting point of BO. Figure (9a) plots the mean and standard
deviation of the posterior probability distribution of f conditioned on these five evaluated points.
As one can see, the standard deviation is small around the points that have been evaluated and is
large at locations where we do not have any data. The acquisition function shown in Figure (9b)
reveals that the next α to be evaluated is around 0.53.
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Figure 10: Convergence of BO
With the initial five evaluated points, we run BO until convergence. The convergence of BO in
this study is defined as choosing 5 consecutive α’s with the distance between every two consecutive
α’s below a threshold of 0.05. In other words, BO converges when it starts choosing similar α’s to
evaluate. The convergence is presented in Figure (10). Note that the horizontal axis starts with
iteration index 2 because it is meaningless to calculate the distance between α in the first iteration
and the initial five α’s. We can see that BO initially chooses quite different α’s and gradually
converges after the 6th iteration. In other words, BO chooses similar α’s after the 6th iteration.
The resulting posterior probability distribution of f from BO is presented in Figure (11). It is
noticeable that the evaluation of the objective on α’s seems noisy. In other words, the evaluated
objective may be slightly different at the same α. This is expected because there are multiple local
optima when solving the lower level MARL. Actually, it is commonly impossible to find a global
optimum using deep learning. Thus researchers usually settle for local optima (Goodfellow et al.,
2016). Local optima introduce noise into the evaluation of the objective at each α. Although the
evaluations are noisy, the fitted curve is able to capture the mean objective f for each α. The
optimal α is determined as 0.55, yielding an optimal mean objective f = 0.90. The optimum is
8.4% higher than the objective f = 0.83 without any reward design.
Figure 11: Posterior probability distribution of f after BO converges
2. Analytical method. Due to the simplicity of this case, we can analytically derive the optimal
value of α and shed some light on the effectiveness of the proposed platform service charge. Recall
that the optimal policy for all drivers is to enter grid #4 when α = 0. The resulting DS ratio
in grid #4 is 5/10 = 0.5, which is well below 1, meaning that grid #4 is oversupplied. ORR is
5/7 = 71.4%. To increase ORR, one needs to increase α to penalize drivers who oversupply a grid.
As α gradually increases, grid #4 becomes less attractive, because the expected return one driver
can earn decreases as α increases. When the expected return one driver can earn is less than $4.9,
some drivers will choose to enter grid #1 instead of grid #4 for a higher monetary return. Note
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that to ease the analysis, we assume the number of drivers entering a grid is always an integer.
Now we present how we calculate the critical value of α below which there is no driver choosing
to enter grid #1 while above which there is one driver attracted by grid #1. With one driver
entering grid #1, there are 99 drivers entering grid #4, resulting a 50/99 = 0.51 DS ratio in grid
#4. SC#4 = α × (1 − 0.51) = 0.49α, meaning that the expected return for these 99 drivers is
$10× (1− 0.49α)× 50
99
= 5.05× (1− 0.49α). The expected return for the driver entering grid #1
is $4.9. We then have the critical condition 5.05× (1− 0.49α) = 4.9, yielding α = 0.06. Similarly,
we calculate the critical value of α below which there are 19 drivers choosing to enter grid #1 while
above which there are 20 drivers attracted by grid #1, and the critical value is α = 0.58.
Table 3: Values of interest
α 0 0.06 0.58 (optimal)
DS ratio in grid #1 (t = 1) N.A. (supply is zero) 20/1 = 2000% 20/20 = 100%
DS ratio in grid #4 (t = 1) 50/100 = 50.0% 50/99 = 50.5% 50/80 = 62.5%
ORR 50/70 = 71.4% 51/70 = 72.9% 100%
OSC 0 0.03 0.18
f 0.83 0.83 0.93 (optimum)
Values of interest are presented in Table (3). With α = 0, ORR = 71.4% and OSC = 0. The
objective is 35 ×ORR + 25 (1−OSC) = 0.83. With α increasing to 0.06, there is one driver attracted
by grid #1, resulting in a 72.9% ORR. The OSC is calculated as follows. The DS ratio in grid #4
is now 0.51, resulting in SC#4 = 0.06 × (1 − 0.51) = 0.03. Thus, OSC = $10× 50× 0.03
$10× 50 + $4.9 = 0.03.
The objective is 35 ×ORR+ 25 (1−OSC) = 0.83. Similarly, with α increasing to 0.58, ORR = 100%,
OSC = 0.18, and the objective is 0.93. Increasing α further does not improve ORR but increases
OSC, resulting in a decrease in the objective. Thus, the analytically derived optimal value of α is
0.58.
The derived optimal value of α from BO, i.e., 0.55, agrees well with the analytically derived optimal
value of α, i.e., 0.58. The optimum from BO, i.e., 0.90 is quite close to its analytical counterpart,
i.e., 0.93. The small discrepancy between the numerical solution and the analytical one is explained
as follows. In the analytical solution, the policy for agents is deterministic and exactly twenty drivers
choose grid #1 after increasing α to 0.58; while in BO, the derived optimal policy for agents is stochastic,
introducing variance in drivers’ actions. For example, the derived optimal policy says each driver has a
20% probability of choosing grid #1 and a 80% probability of choosing grid #4. Although the expected
number of agents in grid #1 is 20 and the expected number of agents in grid #4 is 80, the probability
of 21 agents choosing grid #1 is
(
100
21
) · 0.879 · 0.221 = 9.5%. This variance reduces both ORR and (1 -
OSC), resulting in a lower objective from BO, compared with the objective from the analytical solution.
5.2. Multiclass taxi driver repositioning under congestion pricing
In this case study, we apply the proposed bilevel optimization model to a real-world scenario where
city planners aim to mitigate traffic congestion in the central business district (CBD). As an effective
way to improve traffic condition, congestion pricing has been adopted by many cities such as London and
Stockholm (de Palma and Lindsey, 2011). The basic idea of congestion pricing is to impose a toll charge
on all vehicles entering the CBD. Consequently, some drivers may be sensitive to the toll charge and take
alternative travel modes such as subway while some drivers could bear the toll charge. To demonstrate
the effectiveness of congestion pricing, we use NYC taxi and subway data due to data availability.
In the taxi market, congestion pricing affects both the demand and supply. On the demand side, the
toll charge is passed to passengers for taxi drivers carrying passengers into the CBD. In other words, the
fare paid by passengers is increased and thus the demand (i.e., number of passenger requests) is decreased.
According to Schaller (1999), taxi demand falls by 0.22×x percent when taxi fare increases by x percent.
For example, when taxi fare increases from $10 to $12.5 (i.e., increases by 25%) for a trip, the demand
falls by 5.5% (i.e. 0.22×25%). On the supply side, the toll charge is paid by taxi drivers when they enter
the CBD vacantly, which discourages drivers from entering the CBD without any passenger. The overall
effect of congection pricing results in a reduced number of taxis in the CBD, leading to an improved
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traffic condition. This, however, may direct too many passengers, whose taxi requests are unfulfilled, to
the public transit which is already running at full pressure during rush hours (Plitt, 2020). Thus, there
exists a tradeoff between reducing the number of taxis in the CBD and maintaining a reasonable level
of crowdedness in the public transit system.
Note. Considering that the goal of this case study is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
bi-level optimization model on a real-world large-scale problem, we simplify the modeling of demand
to a linear model in which demand falls when fare increases. We acknowledge that a more realistic
econometric model such as a logit model could be adopted to model passengers’ willingness to pay and
demand elasticity under congestion pricing. However, we may not be able to calibrate the econometric
model due to data accessibility. In addition, the calibration process may introduce more uncertainty into
our model. Therefore, a linear model is used as a demonstration in this case study, and a more realistic
model to capture the coupling effect between the demand and supply is left for future research.
The objective of city planners thus consists of two components, namely, the number of taxis in the
CBD and the crowdedness of the public transit system. Considering the accessibility of data (i.e., NYC
taxi data and subway data), we make two assumptions: (1) The proposed congestion pricing scheme
only affects the behavior of taxi drivers, as previously mentioned; (2) The subway system is used as a
proxy of the public transit of the city.
To be more precise, Figure (12) presents objectives of city planners and how planners derive the
best control. City planners impose a toll charge on taxis entering the CBD. Adaptive taxis learn the
optimal policy by the mean-field actor-critic algorithm under the toll charge. With fewer taxis searching
for passengers in the CBD, more unfulfilled passenger requests are directed to the subway system. City
planners observe the number of taxis in the CBD and crowdedness in the subway and adjust the toll
charge to achieve a better balance between these two objectives. This process repeats until city planners
reach a satisfactory balance.
Figure 12: Objectives of city planners
5.2.1. Data preprocessing
The NYC taxi trip records are publicly available on the official website of NYC Taxi & Limousine
Commission (https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/about/tlc-trip-record-data.page). We use the data for both
yellow and green taxis during May 2014 before the wide adoption of ridesharing service such as Uber and
Lyft and after the business of green taxis gradually stabilizes. A data sample is listed in Table (4). Each
entry in Table (4) collects the order information, including pickup and dropoff time and locations and
fares (including tips). In total there are around 16 million taxi trips. We first remove the weekend data
because trip patterns over weekends are obviously different from that on weekdays. We then restrict the
time interval of interest as the evening peak, i.e., 4 PM to 8 PM. There are 2 million taxi trips in the
weekday data after preprocessing.
Table 4: Taxi data sample
pickup date-
time
dropoff
datetime
pickup lon-
gitude
pickup lati-
tude
dropoff
longitude
dropoff lat-
itude
fare
2014-05-01
16:59:00
2014-05-01
17:08:30
-73.978818 40.785048 -73.965570 40.800718 6.5
2014-05-01
16:59:00
2014-05-01
17:23:00
-73.960280 40.778892 -73.975542 40.751427 15.5
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Figure 13: Spatial discretization of the area
Figure (13) presents the spatial discretization of the area of interest. There are in total 337 grids with
a side length of 1 km covering the area from Manhattan to two airports located in Queens. Taxi orders
outside grids consist of less than 2% of the overall taxi orders and are not considered. Each longitude and
latitude coordinate is transformed into a grid index. As for the temporal discretization, the evening peak
is divided into eighty 3-minute time intervals and the pickup time and dropoff time are transformed into
time interval index. Grids shown as bold red squares cover the CBD of NYC, which is the area between
19th street and 59th street in Manhattan. The proposed congestion pricing is applied to vehicles cross
the red square into the CBD.
Figure 14: Spatial distribution of taxi orders during evening peak
Figure (14) presents the spatial distribution of taxi orders (pickup) during evening peak. It can be
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seen that the majority of taxi orders emerge in Manhattan, especially in the CBD. There are two local
hotspots near two airports.
NYC subway turnstile data is also publicly accessible (http://web.mta.info/developers/turnstile.html).
A sample of the turnstile data is listed in Table (5). These two rows show that the reading of entries
for turnstile ID (A002, R051, 02-00-00) is 4,593,637 at 4 PM and 4,594,523 at 8 PM on 05/01/2014.
Taking the difference between two readings yields the net entries at this turnstile during the 4-hour time
interval, i.e., 4,594,523 - 4,593,637 = 886. Similarly, we can calculate net entries and net exits for each
turnstile. Net entries and net exits of a grid are then calculated by summing up the net entries and net
exits of all turnstiles in that grid, respectively.
Table 5: Turnstile data sample
Turnstile ID Date Time Entries Exits
(A002, R051, 02-00-00) 05/01/2014 16:00:00 4,593,637 1,564,283
(A002, R051, 02-00-00) 05/01/2014 20:00:00 4,594,523 1,564,348
5.2.2. Lower level MARL setup
To be concrete, we now provide the setup of the lower level MARL.
• Observation. The observation space for driver i consists of the grid index and current time, i.e.,
oi = (li, t). One-hot encoding is used for both grid index and time. Yellow and green taxis share
the same observation space.
• Action. The action space for driver i is to enter one of neighboring grids or to stay at the current
grid. Due to a grid world setup with square grids, the action space is thus 5-dimensional (using one-
hot encoding). For example, driver i currently at grid li = (5, 4) chooses action ai =→ (i.e., (1, 0)
in the 2-dimensional grid world setup). The driver will arrive in grid (6, 4) to search for passengers.
In the boundary grids, we still allow drivers to choose any action from the 5-dimensional action
space. If a driver chooses an action that will lead her out of the study area after taking the action,
the driver receives a large penalty (i.e., a large negative reward) and is forced to stay in the current
grid. Thus drivers will not choose an action that will lead them out of study area after training.
• Reward. The reward of each state transition for driver i is her monetary return, i.e.,
r = fare− toll charge,
where
toll charge =
{
α if driver goes from outside the CBD into the CBD,
0 otherwise.
Multiclass MARL. The NYC taxi market contains two types of taxicabs, namely yellow taxis and
green taxis. They are different because yellow taxis can go and pick up passengers anywhere while green
taxis are not allowed to pick up passengers in Manhattan below East 96th Street and West 110th Street
and at two airports, namely LaGuardia airport (LGA) and John F. Kennedy airport (JFK). Therefore we
need to model them differently in the lower level MARL. To incorporate these two classes of agents into
MARL, we create two actors and critics. All the yellow taxis share one actor (i.e., a policy network) and
one critic (i.e., value network), and green taxis share the other actor and the critic. In the actor-critic
algorithm demonstrated in Fig 4, both yellow and green agents interact with the same environment.
They have the same observation space and action space. In other words, for both yellow and green taxis,
its observation consists of the grid index and current time, and its action is to enter one of neighboring
grids or to stay in the current grid. In addition, both of them aim to maximize their cumulative monetary
return.
The key difference is, green taxis can drop off and search for passengers in those restricted areas
(i.e., Manhattan below East 96th Street and West 110th Street and two airports), they can not pick
up passengers there. From the modeling perspective, the environment will not assign orders to green
taxis in restricted areas. This restriction discourages green taxis from searching for passengers or taking
passengers to the restricted areas. Accordingly, the policy for green taxis is expected to be different from
that of yellow taxis. Yellow taxis thus only compete among themselves in the restricted areas, while
outside restricted areas, yellow and green taxis not only compete within the same type but also compete
with the other taxi type.
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5.2.3. Upper level objective function of city planners
As previously mentioned, the objective function of city planners consists of two components, namely,
number of vehicles in the CBD and the crowdedness of the public transit. Now we formally define these
two components based on NYC taxi data and subway turnstile data.
The first component is defined as the percentage of taxis in the CBD, i.e, the ratio of the number
of taxis in the CBD to the total number of taxis. For each time step, we calculate one value of the
percentage. We then take the average of the percentages across all time steps as the overall percentage
of taxis in the CBD. Hereafter we call this PTC (percentage of taxis in the CBD). PTC decreases with
toll charge because fewer vacant taxis enter the CBD with a higher toll charge.
PTC =
∑
t∈{1,2,··· ,T}
∑
l∈CBD num taxistl
total num taxis
T
,
where num taxistl is the number of taxis in grid l at time step t and total num taxis is the total number
of taxis.
The crowdedness of the subway system in each grid is further decomposed into two parts, namely,
the entry crowdedness which is related with the net entries into the subway system within the grid, and
the exit crowdedness which is related with the net exits from the subway system within the grid. After
imposing a toll charge on taxis entering the CBD, the crowdedness of the subway system increases due
to the unserviced taxi orders. Here we assume that travel demand stemming from the unserviced taxi
orders goes to the subway system. For a grid l, we count the number of passengers of unserviced taxi
orders with its origin inside the grid and call this quantity the additional entry into the subway system.
We then take the ratio of the additional entry to the net entries within the grid as the increase in the
entry crowdedness in grid l, denoted as ICSentryl where ICS stands for “an increase in crowdedness of
the subway”. Mathematically,
ICSentryl =
∑
order∈unserviced orders 1originorder∈l × num passengersorder
net enteriesl
.
where originorder and num passengersorder denote the origin and number of passengers of the order,
respectively. Similarly, we can calculate the increase in the exit crowdedness in grid l as
ICSexitl =
∑
order∈unserviced orders 1destinationorder∈l × num passengersorder
net enteriesl
.
Taking the average of the increase in the entry crowdedness and the increase in the exit crowdedness
yields the increase in the crowdedness of the grid, namely,
ICSl =
ICSentryl + ICS
exit
l
2
.
Among the overall 337 grids, we focus on the top m grids in terms of crowdedness. Thus the overall ICS
is calculated as
ICS =
∑
l∈top m grids ICSl
m
,
where m = 20 in this case study. ICS increases with the toll charge because more passengers are directed
to the subway system with a higher toll charge.
From the perspective of city planners, both PTC and ICS are expected to be small. These two
components, however, are competing against each other. With a small toll charge, ICS is small but PTC
is large; while with a large toll charge, PTC becomes smaller but ICS gets larger. Therefore city planners
need to maintain some balance between these two components. Here we use a weighted average of these
two components as the objective of city planners. To ensure maximization, we add a minus sign:
f = −[w × PTC + (1− w)× ICS] (17)
where w ∈ [0, 1] is the weight for PTC. In this case study, we set w = 15 considering the difference in
the magnitude of two components. We also conduct sensitivity analysis to investigate the impact of w
on the final result.
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5.2.4. Results
On weekdays, there are on average around 100,000 taxi orders during the evening peak. According to
Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxicabs of New York City), there are around 13,000 yellow
“medallion” taxicabs in NYC. Considering that some drivers do not work during the evening peak and
some drivers work outside the grid world, we thus set the number of yellow agents in MARL as 12,000.
The number of green agents is set to 5,000 considering that there were in total around 6,000 green taxi
drivers in 2015 and some of them may not work during the evening peak.
In the mean field actor-critic algorithm, the critic is parameterized by an MLP with four hidden layers
(256, 128, 64, 32), and the actor is parameterized by an MLP with four hidden layers (128, 64, 32, 16).
Other hyperparameters remain the same.
For a bilevel optimization problem, first we need to check the convergence of the lower level. As
an example to validate the convergence, PTC, ICS, and average cumulative reward (i.e., Reward in
Figure (15)) of all agents versus number of episodes are presented in Figure (15) with α = 0 and
α = 5.1. In both scenarios, despite some bouncing back and forth due to the initial random exploration
of agents, PTC increases fast during the first 7,500 episodes where agents explore the environment and
learn towards the optimal policy. Increase in PTC indicates that agents are gradually moving into the
CBD to search for passengers, which is as expected. After 15,000 episodes, PTC reaches its converged
value of 0.32 in the first scenario with α = 0 and 0.26 in the second scenario with α = 5.1, respectively.
Conversely, ICS decreases during the first 5,000 episodes, meaning that agents are gradually searching
in right places so that more passengers requests are fulfilled. ICS reaches its converged value of 0.035
after 5,000 episodes in the first scenario with α = 0 and 0.041 after 7,500 episodes in the second scenario
with α = 5.1, respectively. The average cumulative reward reaches its final converged value of 79.3
in the first scenario with α = 0 and 75.2 in the second scenario with α = 5.1, respectively. All three
metrics gradually converge after 12,500 episodes when agents mainly exploit the knowledge they have
gained through their previous explorations. The computation time for running the mean field actor-critic
algorithm until convergence of the lower level MARL is around 38 hours on a virtual machine with 1
NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPU and 8 standard CPUs on Google Cloud Platform.
(a) α = 0 (b) α = 5.1
Figure 15: Convergence of the lower level MARL
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(a) Posterior probability distribution of f conditioned
on the initial five evaluated points
(b) Acquisition function (UCB)
Figure 16: Posterior probability distribution and acquisition function at iteration 0
With the validated convergence of the lower level MARL, we use BO to solve the bilevel problem. In
total we evaluate five α’s as the starting point of BO. Figure (16a) plots the mean and standard deviation
of the posterior probability distribution of f conditioned on these five evaluated points. As one can see,
the standard deviation is small around the points that have been evaluated and is large at locations
where we do not have any data. The acquisition function shown in Figure (16b) reveals that the next α
to be evaluated is 5.95. According to Figure (9a), the mean is high and the standard deviation is high
around 5.95, indicating a large acquisition.
Figure 17: Convergence of BO
The convergence of BO in this case is defined as choosing 5 consecutive α’s with the distance between
every two consecutive α’s below a threshold of 0.5. The convergence of BO is plotted in Figure (17). We
can see that BO initially chooses quite different α’s and gradually converges from the 7th iteration.
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(a) Posterior probability distribution of f after BO con-
verges
(b) Two components
Figure 18: BO result
The resulting posterior probability distribution of f from BO is presented in Figure (18a). The
optimal toll charge is $5.1 with an optimal objective around −0.08. The objective is −0.09 without
any toll charge. The objective increases with the toll charge when smaller than $5.1. With a $5.1 toll
charge, the objective is −0.08, which is 7.9% higher than −0.09. The objective decreases if toll charge
is increased beyond $5.1. The standard deviation within the range of [4, 6.2] is quite small because we
have enough evaluations within the range so the uncertainty is low. As for the range of [0, 2.2], [6.2, 8.3],
and [8.3, 10], the standard deviation is large, indicating a large uncertainty in these ranges. BO does
not choose to evaluate α in these ranges with a large uncertainty because of a low mean value and
therefore a small acquisition in these ranges. The parabolic shape of the objective can be explained
by Figure (18b). Before the toll charge reaches $5.1, the steady increase in −w × PTC and the minor
decrease in −(1 − w) × ICS push the objective higher with a larger toll charge. After the toll charge
is increased beyond $5.1, −(1 − w) × ICS declines faster and suppresses the effect of the increase in
w × PTC, resulting in a decrease in the objective.
Figure 19: Sensitivity analysis
To investigate the impact of the weighting parameter w on the optimal toll charge, sensitivity analysis
is conducted by running BO with various values of w and a preset range of α ∈ [0, 10]. The result is
presented in Figure (19). Recall that city planners aim to minimize both ICS and PTC, and a larger toll
charge usually discourages taxis from entering the CBD, resulting in a lower PTC and a higher ICS. With
w = 0, city planners put all weights on ICS, and the optimal toll charge is simply zero. As w increases,
city planners gradually put more weights on PTC, resulting in an increase in the optimal toll charge.
With w = 110 and w =
1
5 , optimal toll charges are $4.2 and $5.1, respectively. As plotted in Figure (18b),
the magnitude of −w × PTC is already larger than that of −(1− w)× ICS with w = 15 . Increasing w
further increases the discrepancy between the magnitude of −w × PTC and that of −(1 − w) × ICS.
In other words, the magnitude of −w × PTC is much larger than that of −(1−w)× ICS when w > 15 ,
especially when w > 12 . With w >
1
2 , the optimal toll charge is around $10, which is the upper bound of
the preset range, because now city planners focus much more on PTC than ICS. In practice, the selection
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of the weight depends on how city planners’ weighs in subway crowdedness and traffic congestion arising
from taxis in CBD. Figure (19) also provides a guidance to planners if they also need to maintain a
reasonable value of the optimal toll.
Figure (20a) presents the average percentage of taxis in each grid for two scenarios, namely without
any toll charge and with the optimal toll charge. With the optimal toll charge, the percentage of taxis
in Manhattan, especially in the CBD, is decreased, while that for two airports are increased. This is
as expected because taxi drivers are penalized for entering the CBD vacantly, meaning that CBD now
becomes less attractive to taxi drivers. According to the demand distribution shown in Figure (14), two
airports become comparatively attractive. Figure (20b) presents the increase in crowdedness across the
busiest 20 grids. With the optimal toll charge, the increase in crowdedness in the subway is higher in
the CBD, compared to that without any toll charge, because now there are fewer taxis in the CBD and
therefore more passengers are directed to the subway system. For grids outside CBD, the increase in
crowdedness can be either higher or lower because the crowdedness consists of two components, namely,
the entry crowdedness and the exit crowdedness. The increase in entry crowdedness is expected to be
lower for grids outside CBD because there are more vacant taxis outside the CBD who is willing to carry
passengers into CBD. The increase in exit crowdedness is higher in many grids because more people take
subway to arrive in grids outside the CBD.
(a) Percentage of taxis in each grid (grids with percentage lower than 0.001 are omitted)
(b) Increase in crowdedness across the busiest 20 grids
Figure 20: Spatial distribution of percentage of taxis in each grid and increase in crowdedness across the busiest 20 grids
6. Conclusion
Noticing the underutilization of taxi resources due to idle taxi drivers’ cruising behavior, this study
aims to model the multi-driver repositioning task through a mean field multi-agent reinforcement learning
approach. A mean field actor-critic algorithm is developed to solve the MARL with a given reward
30
function. The direct application of the mean field actor-critic algorithm is, however, very likely to
yield a suboptimal equilibrium from the standpoint of the system. Thus, this study proposes a bilevel
optimization with the upper level as a reward design and the lower level as an MAS. The upper level
interacts with the lower level by adjusting rewards. The bilevel optimization model is applied to two
scenarios, namely, e-hailing driver repositioning under service charge and taxi driver repositioning under
congestion pricing. In the case of e-hailing driver repositioning, the agreement between the derived
optimal control from BO and that from an analytical solution validates the effectiveness of the model.
It is also worth mentioning that the objective of the e-hailing platform is increased by 8.4% using a
simple piecewise linear platform service charge. In the case of multiclass taxi driver repositioning, a $5.1
toll charge increases the objective of city planners by 7.9%, compared to that without any toll charge.
With the optimal toll charge, the number of taxis in the CBD is decreased, indicating a better traffic
condition. The crowdedness is increased in the subway stations within the CBD due to fewer taxis.
For subway stations outside the CBD, the crowdedness can be either higher or lower depending on the
tradeoff between the entry crowdedness and the exit crowdedness.
The aforementioned two driver-repositioning applications validate the effectiveness of the proposed
bilevel optimization model. We stress that the model is general and can be applied to various systems
as long as there are two levels in the system and the upper level can affect the lower level through some
control. With some optimal control, the performance of the system can be improved, which is beneficial
for the urban economy.
There are some future work that can be done to overcome some limitations of this study.
1. In this study, drivers are assumed to be intelligent and perfectly rational. Bounded rationality
could be studied to more realistically capture the boundedly rational behavior of real drivers. For
example, in our first case study, to maximize ORR, we assume the platform chooses the largest
possible value of α. There might exist a threshold or an indifference band. When α if larger than
such a threshold, drivers would take other actions and lead to a higher system ORR.
2. Although the difference between yellow taxis and green taxis is considered in the second case
study, the heterogeneity among yellow taxis (or green taxis) is neglected due to the homogeneity
assumption. A more personalized model capturing the behavioral difference within the same type
of agents is left in future research.
3. In the second case study, the demand is modeled separately from the supply without considering
the coupling effect between the two. In addition, only two modes, namely taxi and subway are
used due to data accessibility. In reality, passengers’ mode choice and willingness to pay need to
be modeled to capture their impact on the demand, which subsequently affect the distribution of
supply.
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